‘If independence goes, the planning system goes’: New Political Governance and the English Planning Inspectorate by Hickman, Hannah & Boddy, Martin
‘If independence goes, the planning system goes’: New Political Governance and the 
English Planning Inspectorate 
 
Abstract  
Radical restructuring of ‘arms-length’ government bodies following the 2010 UK national 
election signalled a change in relations between government and the civil service. This was 
seen as a major shift in modes of governance from ‘new public management’ to a more 
politicised mode of ‘new political governance’. This paper presents an analysis of the impacts 
of these shifts on the English Planning Inspectorate, an executive agency central to the land-
use planning system. It identifies measures by ministers to increase control over the 
Inspectorate that represent a shift in governance culture and a shift in the planning system 
itself.  
Introduction 
The ‘bonfire of the quangos’, the wholesale abolition of many ‘arm-length bodies’ and the 
radical restructuring of many others implemented by the UK Government following the 2010 
national election signalled a major shift in relations between government and the civil 
service. It saw the idea of New Public Management with many public servants in arms-length 
bodies operating as agents of government, increasingly displaced by New Political 
Governance (Aucoin 2012). These changes reflected the desire on the part of government to 
challenge bureaucratisation and roll back the over-extended state.  Crucially it was seen as an 
attempt by government to secure greater political responsiveness and control over the civil 
service. Those arms-length bodies that survived the bonfire nevertheless experienced a 
tightening of control from their parent departments and ministers (Flinders and Tonkiss, 
2016). This paper provides an empirical case study of the impact of these shifts on one 
particular ‘arms-length body’, the Planning Inspectorate in England (PINS) an ‘executive 
agency’ of Central Government at the heart of the national land use planning system. Whilst 
the Inspectorate survived the aftermath of the 2010 election relatively intact, it was 
subsequently exposed to unprecedented pressures including increased ministerial scrutiny and 
intervention, political contestation and legal challenge (Boddy and Hickman 2018) 
amounting, as we argue below, to a major shift towards a more explicitly politicised culture 
of governance, within which the Planning Inspectorate has subsequently operated.    
The paper considers three linked questions: is their evidence of a tightening of 
executive influence over the governance of the Planning Inspectorate since 2010?; if so, what 
were the drivers and what were the  implications for the Planning Inspectorate?; and finally, 
to what extent does the idea of a transition from New Public Management to New Political 
Governance help us understand the nature of these changes and their implications? 
It is structured as follows: first, we expand on the transition from new public 
management to new public governance and the implications for ‘arms-length’ bodies such as 
the Planning Inspectorate; second, we look specifically at the nature of the Planning 
Inspectorate as an arms-length body – and the potential impact on PINS of more politicised 
governance; third, we look at the immediate implications of planning reform for the 
Inspectorate, in particular the ambiguity and tensions implicit in these changes; and, fourth, 
having outlined our methodological approach, we present detailed empirical evidence. This 
focuses on the practical implications of planning reform for the Inspectorate and the 
tightening of executive control over the Planning Inspectorate.  It also presents evidence that 
reform and the range of different interventions which followed, come together as a significant 
shift in the overall culture of governance within which the Inspectorate now operated.   
 
From New Public Management to New Political Governance 
Under New Public Management (NPM), seen as the dominant mode of governance from the 
early 1990s (Hood, 1991; Hood and Dickson, 2015) and characterised by a managerial 
emphasis on efficiency, outcomes and performance (Sager and Sorenson, 2011), public 
servants were portrayed as operating at a distance from the core executive with devolved 
responsibilities for policy implementation. With the intent to de-couple policy and delivery, 
politicians ‘had a strategic, goal-setting role’ and civil servants were ‘supposed to be 
autonomous managers held to account through performance arrangements and incentives’ 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, quoted in Christensen 2012, 1). The logic of NPM, as Flinders 
observes, was ‘to encourage policymakers to ‘depoliticise’ functions’ (quoted in Laffin, 2016, 
356). The ‘embedded tension’ between politicians and what they term the ‘neutral 
competence of a non-partisan civil service’ was ‘kept in balance by applying well-established 
constitutional conventions, ethical principles and agreed practices’ (Boston and Halligan, 
2012, 204). The growth in Arms-Length-Bodies was seen a particular derivative of NPM, 
with its focus on splitting bureaucracies along functional lines.  
Not without its critics as a model of governance (see Dunleavy and Hood, 1994), the 
persistence and extent of the NPM logic has been questioned. In particular, NPM has been 
seen as underplaying the reality of the political dynamics within the civil service. Under 
NPM, the ‘dilemma’ for politicians was ‘political insulation from delegation but weakened 
central control’ (Dommett and Flinders 2015). The late 1990s on saw ministers ‘struggling at 
times to ensure that their political priorities and objectives are given appropriate weight’ 
(Boston and Halligan, 2012, 210). Increased political interest in outcomes, according to 
Boston and Halligan, created a ‘heightened point of contestation’ between ministers and civil 
servants which was particularly acute where civil servants were ‘delivering specific statutory 
responsibilities that they are required to exercise independently of the government of the day’ 
and where ‘responsiveness to the political will of the government of the day … is not the only 
imperative guiding the actions of public servants’ (ibid). These political interests were 
heightened in a context of increased media challenge, increasing demands for transparency, 
the more overt role of stakeholders and interest groups, greater policy challenge and an 
increasingly volatile electorate (Grube 2015). The response saw politicians seeking to 
‘reassert their authority’ (Boston and Halligan, 2012, 204) and increasingly ‘preoccupied 
with strengthening the capacity of the centre, both politically and administratively’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007). This shift towards New Political Governance, which Laffin 
(2016) later termed ‘Post-Democratic’ forms of governance, sought to ‘enable political 
executives to regain a degree of political control’ (Christensen, 2012, 2) and accountability. 
Practical consequences of these emerging models have been seen as an increase in vertical 
control in preference to the hub and spoke model of NPM, permanent electoral campaigning, 
growth of political advisers and ministerial staff, potential politicisation of senior ranks of the 
civil service or at least promotion of those on board with the government’s agenda, and an 
expectation of public support on the part of civil servants for partisan policy (Grube 2015; 
Aucoin, 2012, Jarvis and Bakvis, 2012). According to Laffin ‘the role of ministers has shifted 
towards a greater stress on “political bureaucratic management”’ arguing that ‘the new 
populist adversarial politics is evident in how politicians now challenge these once-secret 
gardens of professional-administrative decision making’ (2016, 358). More broadly, new 
forms of political governance have raised important questions about the value and endurance 
of impartiality and independence, characteristics long vested in the civil service.  
New Political Governance and arms-length-bodies 
In the UK context, the shift towards more explicit ‘political governance’ was expressed in 
particular in the wholesale abolition and restructuring of arms-length bodies or ‘quangos’ as 
one of the defining organisational forms of New Public Management, a radical reform 
‘impressive in terms of not only its breadth and depth but … speed’ (Flinders and Skelcher, 
2012).  This saw 130 arms-length-bodies of different types abolished, and 150 merged into 
fewer than 70 across the full range of policy sectors (Cabinet Office, 2012).  
Executive Agencies on the other hand - described as ‘semi-detached central 
government bodies’ (James et al, 2012, 58) with ‘a clear focus on delivering specific outputs 
within a framework of accountability to ministers’ (Cabinet Office, 2018, 4) -  largely 
survived – a distinction that is important in the context of the Planning Inspectorate. Despite 
their similarities to other arms-length bodies, including their ‘significant degree of day-to-day 
autonomy’ (Flinders and Skelcher, 2012) they were considered beyond the reach of the 
reform process.  According to the cabinet minister at the time: ‘executive agencies – are not 
in the review's scope. They are directly controlled by Ministers who are accountable to 
Parliament for what they do’ (Hansard, 14 October 2010).  They even enjoyed what has been 
described as ‘a new lease of life under the Coalition Government (Jenkins and Gold, 2011), 
framed as ‘representing the most appropriate balance between autonomy and control’ 
(Flinders and Tonkiss, 2016), and identified as the ‘default model’ for where there is a need 
to deliver a function within central government but which requires some ‘operational 
independence’ from ministers (Minister for the Cabinet Office, quoted in Elston, 2013, 6). 
 At one level executive agencies lived on. There was, however, a major ‘reframing’ or 
‘control shift’, which transformed the relationship between parent departments and the 
surviving arms-length-bodies (Elston, 2013, 2014). This saw a shift away from 
‘decentralisation and de-politicisation’ towards ‘centralized and politically proximate’ 
(Elston, 2014, 469), a shift from what Flinders and Tonkiss (2016) termed a more 
‘permissive’ to a more ‘authoritative’ model of parenting. Elston later observed that agencies 
‘superficially, look very much as originally intended, and yet operate quite differently in 
practice’ (2017, 101).  
 In terms of their wider international significance, shifts in the balance between 
autonomy and control of agencies (described as a ‘standard institutional choice in Europe and 
beyond’ Ennser-Jedenastik) have been observed (see OECD (2010, 13) on the observable 
shift between the ‘steering and control of agencies’ at a European scale). UK experience 
mirrors more general accounts of ‘a decade of “reinventions” across Europe, a counter-
reaction to “agencification”, aiming to rationalise the agency landscape to (re)enhance 
transparency, political control and government-wide efficiency (Verhoest, 2018, 328). Levels 
of control, it has been argued will, however, vary in practice across different policy fields and 
institutions depending for example on political sensitivity, risk and salience to government 
objectives (Institute for Governance, 2012; Doern and Kernaghan, 2012; James and Thiel, 
2013). These accounts emphasise the importance of empirical case-studies such as that 
presented here as a means of exploring ‘the way task-related features explain agency 
autonomy and control’ (Verhoest 2018, 338).  
The Planning Inspectorate as an arms-length body 
The Planning Inspectorate in England sits at the heart of the national land-use planning 
system, with its inspectors carrying out statutory responsibilities for the approval of local 
land-use plans, hearing appeals against the refusal by elected local councils of applications 
for permission for development and a range of other related issues1. It is an ‘executive 
agency’ of the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), 
accountable to its political head, the Secretary of State. Its core functions have remained 
relatively unchanged since an appeal function in relation to the use of land was created in 
1909. The Inspectorate demonstrates, in general terms, the characteristics of  arms-length-
bodies conceived under New Public Management: it has delegated powers to deliver specific 
outputs against the backdrop of national policy within a framework of accountability to 
ministers, but with a degree of operational and managerial independence, and day to day 
autonomy from ministers.  
More specifically, however, and particularly relevant in framing the current study, forms of 
governance in relation to the Inspectorate, including the most appropriate ‘home’ for 
inspectors within the civil service and their relationship, therefore, with ministers have been 
subject to an ongoing debate. For example, the influential 1957 Franks Committee on 
Administrative Tribunals - that established the enduring principles of fairness, openness and 
impartiality for the operation of administrative tribunals – recommended that planning 
inspectors be moved out of the relevant department with responsibility for planning policy 
and placed as a tribunal under the Lord Chancellor to emphasise their impartiality. This was 
rejected by the then Government who argued the need for ministers to have full responsibility 
for decisions relevant to their own department. However, when, in 1968 legislation allowed 
the relevant Minister to appoint ‘another person’ to determine appeals and the soundness of 
plans such that planning inspectors became decision makers acting on behalf of the Secretary 
of State  (a moment of ‘transformation’ (Grant 2000a, 16) for inspectors), questions once 
again began to surface about the positioning of inspectors. In particular, the arguments later 
 
1 On appeals, planning inspectors make decisions on behalf of the Secretary of State, acting as an independent 
tribunal.  On local plans, inspectors are appointed by the Secretary of State, but act independently, making 
recommendations to local authorities as to whether prospective local plans should be adopted. 
promulgated under NPM about the separation of policy and administration, emerged as 
highly relevant to inspectors. It meant that when inspectors were recommended as front 
runners for agency status in the 1988 ‘Next Steps’ report on the establishment of arms-length 
executive agencies, this was critically justified as helping to ameliorate the perceived conflict 
of interest of Ministers having both a policy maker and appellate role2. Thus, although debate 
about where inspectors should sit within the civil service precedes NPM, its derivatives – 
particularly the rise of agencies as model of governance – are highly relevant to the 
Inspectorate’s history.  
 
Whilst not in formal terms a tribunal, the Inspectorate nevertheless refers to its role as being 
analogous to that of a tribunal: 
 
The role of our inspectors is that of an impartial tribunal or decision-maker. They use 
their skills, experience, knowledge and judgement to weigh up evidence and act in a 
quasi-judicial capacity on appeals or as an impartial contributor to decision-making 
on applications (Planning Inspectorate, 2016, 6). 
 
This was reinforced in a Supreme Court judgement in 2017 which, referring to the 
Inspectorate, commented that: ‘their position is in some ways analogous to that of expert 
tribunals’ (Supreme Court, 2017, para 25). It is also clear that ‘PINS doesn't make policy. All 
we do is test it’ (Richards, quoted in Carpenter 2017, 1). Policy is a matter for ministers, 
inspector’s role being that of implementation - of advising ministers or taking decisions on 
their behalf. In doing so, they ‘are required to exercise their own independent judgement … 
within the framework of national policy as set by Government’ (Supreme Court, 2017, para 
21). PINS, in operating in this ‘quasi-judicial’ space has had a ‘strong tradition’ (Barker and 
Couper, 1984) of independence and in continuing to emphasise the Franks Committee 
principles for tribunals, PINS extols the values of impartiality – long vested in the civil 
service more widely –as being especially important (Planning Inspectorate, 2017, 6). But 
whilst a ‘tradition’ of independence is not the same as ‘de-jure’ or even ‘de-facto’ 
independence, the degree of managerial and operational freedoms provided by agencification 
 
2 This issue has continued to have some prominence, including in a 2001 House of Lords decision (R (Alconbury 
Developments Ltd) v SS for Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23) confirming that a 
Government minister can be both a policy maker and a decision taker without violation of the European 
Human Rights Law. 
appeared to enhance the de-jure independence of inspectors: with de-jure independence seen 
as a ‘synonym for operational impartiality’ (Gregory, 2015, 126), and ‘a powerful political 
constraint’ (ibid) ‘offering a higher quality of regulatory decision making (Koop and Henretty 
2018, 44). Uniquely, inspectors, as well as being civil servants, are also independent 
appointees, perceived externally as operating independently from government and free from 
political interference. Whilst Koop and Hanretty suggest that it is possible for agencies to 
‘have their cake and eat it, and be both independent and accountable’, the two elements need 
to be ‘operationalised carefully and their effects disentangled (ibid).  This, as we go on to 
discuss, represented a particular challenge for the Inspectorate post-planning reform. 
 
The Planning Inspectorate and planning reform 
Inspectors – as with any civil servant – are expected to operate according to the Government 
of the day. Consequently, and as Grants describes, its work has evolved through ‘a process of 
pragmatic development and adjustment’ (Grant, 2000b, 2). Inspectors have witnessed many 
changes over the last two decades, including those introduced by the Planning and 
Compensation Act 2004 and the Planning Act 2008.  Our focus here, however, is specifically 
on the implications of radical planning reform post-2010.  This we argue, in what Slade 
(2018, i) termed ‘one of the most remarkable policy episodes in the recent history of English 
planning reform’, led to a step-change in the governance of the Planning Inspectorate, with 
wide reaching implications, in turn for the planning system and the practice of planning. 
 
The Inspectorate was radically affected by the 2010 bonfire of the quangos referred to earlier. 
Fundamental reform of the English planning system saw the wholesale abolition of Regional 
Development Agencies, Regional Spatial Strategies and with them strategic level planning, 
planning policy guidance and top-down targets for planned housing delivery at a local level. 
The existing structures and processes of national planning policy were subsequently replaced 
with a new National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (DCLG, 2012), reducing planning 
policy from over 1,000 pages to about 50. This fundamentally changed the policy 
environment of the Inspectorate. Inspectors were now faced with responsibilities for 
decisions on local plan approval and permissions for development in the absence – for the 
first time - of any more detailed regional or sub-regional planning framework,  guidance or 
agreed targets for levels of new housebuilding at a local level (Boddy and Hickman, 2018, 2). 
There were also tensions, at the heart of the new NPPF, described by Lees and Sheppard 
(2015, 17) as incoherent and incompatible, and with potentially significant implications for 
inspectors in exercising their functions. The new policy was rooted in the rhetoric of localism 
with the government ‘committed to passing new powers and freedoms to town halls’ (DCLG, 
2011, 3). It also, however, set out a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development … a 
golden thread running through both plan-making and decision-taking.’ (DCLG, 2012, para 
14) – and as the Minister’s introduction put it ‘Development means growth’. The Planning 
Inspectorate found itself, therefore, faced with managing the tensions between, on the one 
hand, mainly Conservative-voting local communities – and their elected representatives – 
resistant to growth and development and, on the other, the Government’s objectives of 
economic growth, housing delivery and the development needed to support this.  Ambiguity 
and uncertainty was such that the clear distinction between the responsibility of ministers for 
policy and that of the Inspectorate for implementation proved challenging in practical terms. 
Much of this was, moreover, uncharted territory in policy terms, and shifts towards more 
politicised forms of governance – described above – clearly had the potential to impact how 
these policy tensions would play out in practical terms.   
 
Methodology 
Empirical evidence for this study is drawn from interviews with over forty professional 
respondents conducted between July 2014 and June 2016. Researchers were afforded 
unprecedented access to interviewees who included current and former planning inspectors 
(across the breadth of local plan, appeals and national infrastructure work) and administrative 
civil servants in the Inspectorate, as well as lawyers, planning consultants, senior local 
council officers, and representatives of key national organisations. This interview material is 
supplemented by documentary evidence in the form of government policy documents, public 
communication between PINS’ officials and ministers, and parliamentary records. 
Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a common topic-guide. 
The seniority of many interviewees and the potential political sensitivity of views expressed 
resulted in a condition of consent being that all interviews were conducted on the basis of full 
confidentiality and anonymity (Harvey, 2011). This prevents quoted material being attributed 
to individuals, roles or organisations. In most cases, interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. Other cases relied on contemporaneous notes, facilitated by the presence of both 
authors. Transcripts and notes were coded, with thematic analysis undertaken using NVIVO 
qualitative analysis software3. 
The next three sections set out the empirical evidence for the way in which the 
Planning Inspectorate has been impacted by shifts in governance and control in the context of 
the major changes outlined in the national planning policy framework. We look, first, at the 
perspectives of respondents on ambiguities in planning reform; second, at the nature and use 
of mechanisms for ministerial interventions and control; and, finally, at how these have come 
together in an overall reframing of the ‘cultural’ basis of relations between government and 
the Inspectorate.  
Ambiguities in planning reform 
First, in terms of planning reform, respondents frequently commented on the radical nature of 
the post 2010 restructuring of planning policy describing this as ‘revolutionary’ and 
‘unprecedented’ in its impacts. The new National Planning Policy Framework, characterised 
by Travers et al (2013) as ‘determinedly brief’ was seen as ‘loose in many respects’. The 
NPPF was widely seen as having increased ambiguity within the planning system, resulting, 
as a senior member of the Inspectorate put it, in inspectors ‘in effect making policy 
themselves’. Another respondent observed that: 
A well-run planning regime has minimum grey, maximum black and white, the 
difficulties start to arise when there's … a large amount of grey … the shades of grey 
have increased …  
And another, referring to the often-quoted role of inspectors as being to stand in the shoes of 
the Minister, commented: 
If you are going to stand in the shoes of the Secretary of State, then you need to know 
what the shoes are, what they look like. There are big problems now because policy is 
delightfully unclear. 
The loss of strategic planning as the intermediate layer between national policy and local 
plans was seen as key. That local authorities were now to determine their own ‘objectively 
assessed’ housing need was a matter many interviewees saw as ‘a significant weakness’. It 
 
3 The value of elite interviews is highly dependent on a researcher gaining the trust of and establishing a 
rapport with the interviewee, (Dexter 2006, Harvey, 2011). Access was facilitated for this study in that one of 
the researchers had previously held senior roles in planning and governance at a regional level, which helped 
to secure credibility and trust.  
left inspectors having to decide whether local authorities had acted reasonably in the context 
of local assessments of housing need, and to do so without guidance:  
With no warning inspectors had to sort out the mess. There was no template for what 
it [housing numbers] ought roughly to be. All hell broke loose – we kept on having to 
send local authorities away. 
The result was inspectors performing ‘a de facto strategic policy function’ and ‘in effect 
making policy themselves, especially where the NPPF is silent’. This related not only to 
housing allocations in local plans, but also to planning appeal decisions relating, for example, 
to on-shore wind farms and green belt developments as cited by interviewees. Interviewees 
also suggested that increased ministerial interest in planning outcomes and unease at the 
decisions of some inspectors reflected the tensions inherent in the NPPF referred to earlier 
between localism and the presumption in favour of sustainable development which planning 
inspectors faced in practical terms.  Interviewees commented on this lack of clarity: 
There is a judgement that inspectors are making decisions that are not in accordance 
with the policy that ministers want – well that might be the case but it might be that 
the policy is not written down. 
If the Secretary of State does not like decisions that PINS is making then they should 
change the policy formally in an appropriate and democratic and transparent way … 
it’s the fudging of those issues which creates the tension between PINS and DCLG, 
between ministers and inspectors. 
 
This, then, was the policy context within which the Inspectorate saw themselves as operating 
in post-planning reform. 
Ministerial interventions and the desire for control 
In this context of ambiguity what we saw was a range of measures on the part of ministers 
aiming to exert greater control over the policy agenda and decision making. These have taken 
four main forms: (i) ministerial statements and letters to the Inspectorate; (ii) direct 
intervention in decision-making over local plan approval; (iii) ministerial intervention in 
decisions on appeals where planning permission has been refused; and finally, (iv) pressure 
on inspectors to exercise greater pragmatism in order to secure the early approval of local 
plans.  
(i) Ministerial statements and letters 
Interviewees frequently referred to an ‘unprecedented’ series of public letters from ministers 
to PINS ‘reminding’ inspectors of core principles and ‘ensuring our policy position is clear’ 
(see DCLG 2014a, 2014b, 2015a). In the first of these, the minister described being 
‘disturbed by an Inspector’s use of language, which invited misinterpretation of government 
policy’, and ended with the instruction to circulate the letter throughout the Inspectorate to 
‘ensure that they [inspectors] understand the need to choose their words carefully and reflect 
government policy’ (DCLG 2014a, 1). It was suggested that these communications 
represented ‘a personal attack on the Inspectorate’, and a direct response to local political 
pressures. According to one respondent:  
Boles had to be seen to be doing something, to reassure constituency colleagues, 
because everything coming out from Gov seemed to be very pro-housing. 
This first letter was described as ‘a game changer’, with PINS, according to one interviewee, 
‘having to sense-test everything that inspectors are writing’. 
Ministers also used ad-hoc policy statements to publicly address the interpretation of 
planning policy by inspectors. One former inspector commented that statements were a way 
of exerting control:  
Ministerial statements are definitely a way of exerting control over PINS …  they are 
trying to tell PINS how to do something when they [government] should change the 
NPPF. Statements have deflected attention away from Government by targeting 
inspectors. Minsters are boasting that “we are telling inspectors what to do”. It’s not 
how the system is supposed to work.  
Interviewees observed that these communications could have been better directed towards 
MPs or even local authorities themselves, but in the absence of strategic plans, targets and 
guidance, the Inspectorate became Government’s key regulatory mechanism: ‘what reforms 
have done is exposed the Planning Inspectorate as the only mechanism left to use.’  
(ii) Intervention in local plan examinations 
Since 2010, ministers have taken the previously unprecedented step of ‘calling-in’ local plans 
(five to date), for ministers to review – and potentially overturn - the judgement of inspectors 
following examination. In 2016, existing legislation was strengthened giving greater and 
more detailed powers of direction, enabling the Secretary of State ‘to direct the appointed 
person to ‘suspend’ the examination, to consider specified matters, to hear from specified 
persons, or to take other specified procedural steps’ (Parliament 2016, 39, quoted in Vickery 
2016, 540). Vitriolic in his criticism, former planning inspector, Vickery, stated ‘It is clear 
that centralised control of inspectors and authorities is the aim” (ibid). Vickery asserted that 
even the possibility of intervention would on its own create a behavioural shift on the part of 
inspectors: ‘the threat of these draconian intervention powers by the Secretary of State … will 
be enough to cow … the appointed Inspector … and will ensure that they follow the required 
‘direction of travel’ at DCLG. The Inspector will self-censor him or herself and will ‘work 
towards’ what is perceived to be the Minister’s latest desire’ (ibid). Interviewees saw use of 
these powers as the: 
 ‘outcome of an intensely political period … … driven by lack of control. Ministers 
have got no control, that’s the end of it. They didn’t like the fact they couldn’t have 
ultimate sign off. This was a control shift.  
Inspectors were described as being ‘angered’ at such intervention: 
With Birmingham it was clear that the only way was to take land out of the green belt. 
It was the first call-in situation. The inspector was pissed off. A level of political 
interference was imposed … the local MP stirred it up – it was called in to keep him 
quiet.  
The main outcomes of the five interventions have in practice only been substantial delays to 
plans being finalised. Ministers - perhaps ironically – conceding in all five cases that the 
inspectors’ recommendations had in fact been in line with national policy. Politically, 
however, intervention may in part at least have had the desired effect of demonstrating to 
local elected MPs, Councillors and voters, that Ministers had been prepared to take strong 
measures. 
(iii) Intervention in appeals 
There is clear evidence of increased ministerial intervention in appeal decisions under the 
new planning system.  There was a spike in numbers of appeals against refusal of planning 
permission ‘called in’ from 2012/13 rising to a peak in 2015/16 – ministers in effect taking 
over decision-making powers (see Garton-Grimwood and Barton 2019). As detailed 
elsewhere many such cases related to estimates of future housing need and residential 
development at a local level (Boddy and Hickman 2018).  Reinforcing this, in 2012 
delegation to the Inspectorate of decision-making powers was removed in cases that “may 
have significant long-term impact on economic growth and meeting housing needs across a 
wider area than a single local authority” (Boles, quoted in Hansard 26 October 2012). 
Planning lawyers Thirty Nine Essex Street in their annual review (2015,12) noted the 
Secretary of State’s ‘enthusiasm for recovering appeals’ whilst one MP described ‘recovered 
appeals’ as ensuring that community concerns ‘will not be ignored by the “man from the 
Ministry”’ (Aldous, quoted in Hansard 2014, Column104). Ministers justified these shifts as  
the need to “consider the extent to which planning policy … is meeting the Government’s 
clear policy intentions” (quoted in Smith, 2017, 11), and “to illustrate” how policy should 
“apply in practice” (ibid, 16)4. 
Interviewees largely saw recovered appeals as an entirely ‘unsatisfactory way of 
seeking to provide guidance’ in the context of ambiguity, and perceived increased recovery as 
symptomatic of ‘the fact that the Secretary of State does not trust PINS’ to take the decisions 
that are expedient in political terms:  
The secretary of state … has a policy that he doesn’t really like, he’s unable to 
change that policy because it’s a coalition government ... the temptation to pervert the 
decision making through recovered appeals is not quite the way the original 
arrangements for calling things in was intended. There’s a high degree of bias 
around which ones get called in. 
There is more interest in outcomes. Look at wind-turbines – the ministerial interest 
was unprecedented. That all of them were recovered – ministers were concerned that 
inspectors wouldn’t take the decisions they wanted. 
(iv) The push for pragmatism 
Inspectors can, when considering whether a local plan meets the criteria for it to be approved, 
pause an examination and require a local council to undertake further work in line with an 
inspector’s interpretation of national planning policy. This can significantly delay the process 
of getting an approved plan in place. Many such cases turned on a local council’s view on 
planned provision for future housing need, ‘objectively assessed need’. With local plans at 
the heart of the new national planning framework and up-to-date plans providing greater 
certainty in terms of decision-making on the ground, Ministers, were, however increasingly 
 
4 Johnston (2017) cited evidence that the then Secretary of State, Sajid Javid, had been using his powers in 
called-in applications and recovered appeals disproportionately in Conservative seats and observed that ‘an 
appreciable proportion are being refused against inspectors' advice’ (1). 
concerned at lack of progress in getting local plans in place. One interviewee reported a 
minister on a visit to PINS urging inspectors to ‘for God’s sake find more plans sound’.  
A public letter to the Inspectorate and subsequent ministerial statement, during this 
period called for greater pragmatism on the part of inspectors.  The Minister stated that local 
councils: ‘… should be able to rely on Planning Inspectors to support them in the 
examination process’ (DCLG 2015c, 1).  Inspectors were ‘instructed’ to allow councils to 
undertake additional work rather than be required to withdraw a plan, or for a local plan to be 
adopted pending early review despite ‘shortcomings’ – typically in terms of provision for 
future housing growth. Interviewees perceived this instruction as being ‘very MP focussed … 
protecting politicians locally’. Another more bluntly observed that: ‘It looks like a retraction 
… – a farce - going against everything Government has been saying.’  On the other hand, 
according to one ex-inspector: 
It was the only practical approach to get plans moving – we couldn’t get perfect 
plans.  This is all we can do. QC’s will say the same – it’s all that can be done given 
the contradictions between OAN [objectively assessed housing need] and localism.  
Pragmatism was subsequently evident in an increasing number of cases where inspectors 
approved plans with a shortfall of land-supply for housing but subject to an immediate or 
early review (Edgar, 2017). 
Shifts in governance culture 
Impacts of planning reform as described above, combined with more explicit measures on the 
part of government to secure greater control over the policy agenda, drove a significant shift 
in the overall ‘culture of governance’ within which the  Inspectorate operated, culture in the 
sense of shared norms, behaviours and practices. We would suggest that although this is more 
difficult to pin down in terms of hard evidence, this has been more significant and pervasive 
than individual interventions on their own. We would also argue that it represents the coming 
together of multiple forms of intervention set out above to create a more pervasive shift in the 
context within which individual inspectors now dealt with individual cases.  Reinforcing this, 
respondents with recent experience within PINS referred to ’subtle shifts’ in context, a sense 
that ‘life has undoubtedly changed in PINS’.    
One inspector referred specifically to the ‘framework document’ (The Planning 
Inspectorate, Welsh Government, Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2012) which sets out the formal relationship between PINS and its parent departments, 
including ‘arrangements for governance, financial delegations and the payment and 
expenditure of public money and expectations on monitoring, reporting and exchange of 
information’ (4). Highlighting the ‘sponsorship’ element of the framework, they observed::  
The PINS framework document absolutely reads like ‘control’ … There has definitely 
been a change of emphasis. 
Another respondent suggested that the framework was a direct product of the Coalition’s civil 
service reform agenda, stating: 
Those outcomes of the civil service reform plan – like frameworks - which are about 
civil servants delivering what ministers want … are not appropriate to an agency like 
PINS. PINS is supposed to be an arms-length body, semi-autonomous. 
The reference in the framework to a vertical hierarchy between PINS and its parent 
department, in contrast to the original hub-and-spoke conception of agencies (Rutter, 2014, 
Elston 2014) was particularly striking. It states that ‘issues arising are to be resolved by 
DCLG’ and that PINs will only ‘have the opportunity to comment’ (The Planning 
Inspectorate et al, 2012, 5). Effective governance is expected to be managed by a substantial 
list of regular liaison meetings, including ‘regular day to day contact’ (ibid, para 27), 
perceived by a number of interviewees as an increase compared to previous levels of 
communication. One respondent observed that: ‘When X was Chief Executive of PINS X went 
out of his way to keep it out of Whitehall and to keep Whitehall out of PINS. The relationship 
is much more personal now – CLG ringing us to discuss cases is now the mainstream 
approach.’ One inspector described the increased interaction between PINS and its parent 
department as ‘attempts at soft control arising out of problems in the NPPF’ and several 
interviewees noted ‘a trend of Whitehall engaging more closely’, and ‘a mainstream culture 
of constant telephone calls’ with ‘pressures to acquiesce’. The framework document also 
acknowledges the ‘need for changes … in light of evolving departmental policy aims, 
operational factors, and the performance of PINS’ (ibid, 5) and states that PINS will be 
subject to triennial review, including the need ‘to provide robust challenge of the continuing 
need for PINS, both in terms of its functions and its form as an Executive Agency’ (ibid, 29).  
 
Second, respondents also spoke of greater difficulty as compared to pre-2010 arrangements in 
budget sign-off. One talked of ‘departmental meddling in detail’: 
“There were definite attempts to control where the money was being spent – it’s now 
not so easy to get budget signed off.” 
and another intimated that the ‘Centre’ wished to re-gain overall budgetary control of PINS: 
“X said I think the finance director should account directly to the finance director in 
London …. Where they sit in London they see these people down in Bristol, we need 
command and control, so if we’re looking after their accounts … then they're going to 
need my approval. 
Third, several interviewees suggested the appointment in 2014 of Simon Ridley as PINS 
chief executive - a career civil servant with a Treasury background - as an attempt to exert 
control over PINS. Previously this role had been filled by an external appointee or by the 
Chief Planning Inspector. Ridley, it was observed, had no previous planning experience, and 
whilst lack of direct substantive experience relevant to a new role was by no means unusual 
in civil service terms in general, historically, it had been in relation to the Planning 
Inspectorate. As one ex-inspector observed, ‘we are in a different place because we are just 
one stop on a civil servants’ career’.  Another ex-inspector observed: 
When Simon Ridley was appointed we all thought, ‘bloody hell, a bloke from the 
Treasury …  well that spells the end of PINS.  
Finally, the Planning Inspectorate, in its own Annual Report, highlighted the ‘increased 
political focus’ as a risk ‘peaking at very high at the start of the year’, the consequences of 
which were described as ‘increased criticism of inspectors’ decisions … and damage to our 
reputation with communities, developers and Ministers” (Planning Inspectorate, 2016, 13). 
 In terms of quantifiable impacts on planning outcomes, interviewees were more 
circumspect: 
There are attempts without outcomes … or should I say no significant outcomes, one 
or two minor influences. If planning was further down the political agenda it would 
be easier. 
The impacts of attempts to control are largely subtle, and we are probably protected 
by our quasi-judical function. But attempts can’t work, we can’t allow them to work. 
They are rare but I think they are happening more often. There are no examples to 
quote prior to 2010 on the level and scale of recent attempts. 
For interviewees however, the greatest risk was to the Inspectorate’s culture of independence 
which was described as ‘becoming tarnished’ and having ‘shifted with the coalition 
government’.  It was reported by one interviewee, that an internal review had taken place into 
the PINS’ independence during 2013-20145, prompted by ministerial concerns about their 
lack of control over PINS and the potential benefits of re-integration into its parent 
department’6: 
Ministers wanted far greater control over independent inspectors - they didn’t like 
this element of the Planning Inspectorate and wanted to be able to more closely 
influence outcomes.  
Lots of ministers would like to see PINS brought back in-house – to have greater 
control over decision making. 
Striking was the observation that inspectors historically saw themselves ‘as planning 
inspectors first and civil servants second’, whereas now ‘they are increasingly seeing 
themselves as agents in the delivery of government policy, that’s a shift’. Critical however 
was that independence was perceived widely by those interviewed as fundamental to the 
legitimacy of planning decisions: 
The differences between ourselves and other arms-length bodies is the quasi-judicial 
role, the history of independence … The arms-length thing has got to be there. If 
independence goes – the planning system goes. 
Formally, the Inspectorate is an arms-length-body, charged with implementing government – 
and ministerial policy. In terms of organisational culture however, it still clings strongly to its 
quasi-judicial, tribunal-like status and the Franks Committee principles of fairness, openness 
and impartiality.  This in, itself is, in part responsible for the tension between the Inspectorate 
on the one hand and government and ministers of state on the other. 
Discussion and conclusion 
There is substantial evidence of a tightening of executive influence and control over both the 
overall governance of the Planning Inspectorate and over the decisions of individual 
 
5 Whilst no direct causal link can be inferred, over the same period, abolition of PINS was proposed in the 
course of two separate adjournment debates in the Parliament (see for example, Hansard 2013). 
6 An initial request made to DCLG under the freedom information act returned ‘no information’ on a potential 
review of PINS’ agency positioning. A further request confirmed that a review did take place over the 2013-14 
period considering the re-integration of PINS into DCLG, but no further information on content was traceable. 
inspectors. Here we return to our original research questions to consider what drove these 
changes over this particular period, the implications for the Inspectorate and the planning 
system, and the value of New Political Governance as a lens through which to observe and 
understand these changes. 
The drivers of change 
Planning and the national planning system, particularly as they related to the politically 
charged arena of new housebuilding, was high on the agenda of the incoming Coalition 
Government in 2010. Once elected it rapidly set about implementing major structural reforms 
of the planning system. This raised the profile of planning in a political context, both locally 
and nationally. Initially, the swift abolition of the strategic regional tier within the planning 
system and two-year delay in publishing a new policy framework left a ‘planning vacuum’ 
(House of Commons, 2011). This, paradoxically, left ministers with weak strategic policy 
control and little basis to exert operational control. In Flinders and Tonkiss’ (2016) terms 
there was something of a hiatus with a shift towards a looser framework of parental 
management of PINS as compared to previous systems. Publication of the NPPF in 2012 did 
little to address this strategic deficit. Parallel narratives within the framework of on the one 
hand ‘localism’ (raising expectations about increased local control over planning making) 
and on the other ‘the presumption in favour of sustainable development’ (support for housing 
and economic growth) were reflected in ‘incoherence and incompatibility’ (Lees et al 2015). 
Detailed planning guidance having been swept away, there was lack of clarity in terms of the 
detailed interpretation and implementation of policy in practical terms, particularly early on. 
Planning Inspectors were consequently left mediating these tensions, finding themselves in a 
more active position of adjudication, in some areas effectively making policy through their 
decisions. This represented a clear shift in both role and practice. Ministers were increasingly 
faced with parallel – and seemingly irreconcilable – pressures, the need to: evidence their 
initial claims that reforms would speed up plan-making, support housing delivery and 
sustainable growth; and, to respond to constituency level pressures where inspectors’ 
decisions were being publicly maligned as running counter to the Government’s own 
narrative on localism. 
The political fall-out of these pressures heightened ministerial interest in plan-making, 
planning decisions and projected housing numbers and their desire to influence outcomes to 
suit political needs, however contradictory. Against the backdrop of the loss of strategic 
planning, the ‘bonfire’ of regional agencies’ (Cameron, 2009), and major reductions in civil 
service capabilities on planning (including in PINS’ own parent department), PINS was 
exposed as one of the few mechanisms available to Government to influence planning 
outcomes. This – almost inevitably - put PINS in the spotlight with ministers and politicians 
at both central and local levels increasingly focused on the substance and detail of inspector’s 
decision-making and eager to attempt to ‘control’ or ‘discipline’ this activity. This 
represented a major shift in the relationship between PINS and government ministers as 
compared to previous depictions of this relationship in which ministers were described as 
more interested in the quasi-judicial legitimacy rather than substance of decisions (Barker and 
Couper, 1984).  
Implications for the Planning Inspectorate 
The impacts of these drivers of change were framed by the Inspectorate’s culture of 
independence, a culture that preceded its status as an agency and stemmed from the quasi-
judicial nature of its work. Grant (2000b, 6) had previously noted the ‘tension between the 
theory and the reality of the Planning Inspectorate’s independence’, identifying the potential 
for a ‘[ministerial] direction … at any time’ being ‘enough to deprive the inspector of the 
requisite appearance of independence, notwithstanding the limited exercise of the power in 
practice’ (ibid). But clear evidence from this study of an increase in the use of powers of 
‘direction’ has brought to the fore the tensions and challenges for inspectors operating with 
‘relative independence’ (Mualam, 2014, 49) in a quasi-judicial sphere, where both dejure and 
defacto independence have been described as important features of regulatory decision 
making (Koop and Hanretty 2018).  
For the Inspectorate as a whole, the implication that control shifts have overtly 
challenged its independence – such that it is seen as more proximate to ministers – brings 
reputational risk, elevates the prospect of court challenge7, and has the potential to instigate 
further debate about PINS’ continuing agency status. As Verhoest (2018, 336) observed, ‘a 
strong reputation … enables agencies to force more autonomy or to protect their autonomy in 
times of crisis’. For individual inspectors, this post-reform period has been described as 
“intensely difficult”, with inspectors publicly exposed in an unprecedented way. This has 
demonstrably impacted their sense of autonomy, irrespective of whether intervention has 
materially impacted their decisions. There also appears to have been a shift in the way both 
inspectors and ministers perceive the role of a planning inspector: away from a previously 
 
7 The Inspectorate saw high staff turnover during the research period, and there have been reported and ongoing 
recruitment challenges (Donnelly, 2018, Richards, 2018, and Rosewell 2018). 
envisaged professional role in which an inspector is “beholden to no-one, not even 
government” (research interviewee), towards a more active role as an agent in the delivery of 
government policy, and more responsive to political will. 
Implications for the planning system 
For the planning system more broadly, the implications are fundamental. The policy-
administrative split brought about by NPM – and represented in agencification - enhanced the 
legitimacy of planning minsters having both a policy-maker and appellate role. Any 
tightening of control manifested as political interference in decision making would re-blur the 
line between policy and administration, posing challenges to the right within the planning 
system to a fair and impartial appeal by an ‘independent tribunal, whose decisions must take 
account of all evidence put to them as well as local and national planning policy’ (Pitt, 2013, 
1). There has, however, been little substantive evidence of interference resulting in decisions 
that have not been justifiable in policy terms, with interviewees describing ‘attempts’ to 
influence as ‘subtle’, resulting in ‘no significant outcomes, only one or two minor influences’. 
Moreover, it is arguable that ‘attempts’ may have – in fact - been restrained by the legal 
checks and balances of the quasi-judicial nature of the Inspectorate’s work. 
Where ministerial ‘control’ has had a material impact, has been in the use of ‘powers 
of direction’ (Grant 2000a) – the strengthening of powers on local plan call-in and the 
recovery of appeals. These mechanisms have publicly reduced the powers of PINS. Their use 
has also implied a lack of trust in inspectors taking decisions in line with established policy or 
the Government agenda more generally. Use of these powers has deftly deflected attention 
away from the inconsistencies and lack of clarity within Government policy, and onto the 
practice of inspectors.  
The Planning Inspectorate and New Political Governance 
We look finally at the extent to which the idea of New Political Governance helps us to 
understand and make sense of shifts in the relationship between PINS, ministers and 
government.  New Public Management, it has been argued had left politicians with ‘feelings 
of impotence’ (Peters, 2009, 6), and wanting to ‘re-assert their authority’ (Boston and 
Halligan, 2012, 204). Subsequent reforms focused on ‘strengthening the capacity of the 
centre, both politically and administratively’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, 1060) with an 
increased emphasis on more formal vertical control in preference to the ‘hub and spoke’ 
model of NPM. A more politicised environment emerged, with reported behavioural shifts in 
the relationship between ministers and civil servants, with politicians challenging ‘these 
once-secret gardens of professional-administrative decision making’ (Laffin 2016, 358) with 
‘the role of ministers shifting towards a greater stress on “political bureaucratic 
management”’ (ibid).  
This clearly captures and helps make sense of the shifts as described here in the relationship 
between government ministers and the Planning Inspectorate. Those interviewed for this 
study consistently described the operational environment of PINS as having become, as one 
respondent put it, ‘particularly politicised’. There was an internal review of independence, 
and the new framework document described greater vertical control, including changes in the 
nature and frequency of communication between PINS and the core executive. Intervention, 
control and more detailed and more frequent instruction from ministers and key civil servants 
clearly increased over this period, symptomatic of the shift from Public Management to 
Political Governance (James and Thiel 2013; Elston 2017). Planning reform and the new 
National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG 2012) in particular, can itself be seen as 
reflecting the more general move under New Political Governance to roll back the state and 
cut back on top-down rules-based bureaucratic processes.  However, in contrast to one of the 
central narratives of NPG of strengthened central capacity to control sub-ordinate institutions, 
the desire to control PINS appears to have been driven – at least in part - by decreased 
institutional capacity on planning and the weak strategic control of the national planning 
system in the post-reform context, which exposed PINS ‘as the only mechanism left to use’ 
(interviewee). 
The behaviour of ministers was, we would suggest, emboldened by wider cultural 
shifts within the civil service captured in the NPG model of shifts in political-bureaucratic 
relations.  Importantly, however, were the changes specific to the particular policy sector, the 
impacts of ‘localism’ and the ‘passing of powers and freedoms’ to local communities 
described earlier, and the particular nature of politicization of plan-making and decision-
taking which resulted from these changes, which left PINS and the planning system operating 
in a more highly politicized context and much more open to ministerial control and political 
challenge. Whilst some may posit that the NPPF was inadvertently poorly done thus requiring 
greater ministerial interventions (reflective of NPG by accident rather than design) to manage 
the entailing political repercussions, our view is that interventions were a more calculated 
attempt (and therefore a more overt form of NPG) to manage an NPPF that was deliberately 
ambiguous in order that the potentially competing discourses of development and localism 
could exist in parallel. 
This is also consistent with accounts of New Political Governance which emphasise 
the importance of sector-specific context and assert that it is the more politically salient 
policy arenas that are most likely to be impacted (Christensen 2012, Osborne 2010, Aucoin 
2012, Grube 2015). It has also been argued that New Political Governance should be seen not 
so much as fundamental transformation of public administration but as a subtle process of 
more gradual change modifying and combining with earlier models of governance ‘... used in 
different ways according to policy area and political saliency’ (Christensen, 2012).  As 
described earlier, PINS experienced a marked shift in the culture of governance within which 
they operate on a day to day basis.  It survived however, more radical moves to absorb it into 
its parent department and still retains a significant degree of independence and quasi-judicial 
status.  We would conclude, therefore that NPG should not be seen as a form of over-arching 
meta-narrative, nor as a fundamentally new model of governance replacing what has gone 
before.  It offers instead a way of framing shifts in particular and more specific policy sectors 
and contexts, the understanding of which requires more detailed empirical analysis of the 
type which we have aimed to provide here: a means, we would suggest, of better 
understanding the significant shifts in relations between the Planning Inspectorate and 
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